Markus Meumann / Andrea Pühringer (eds.)

The Military in the Early Modern World

V&R unipress

Herrschaft und soziale Systeme in der Frühen Neuzeit

Band 26

Herausgegeben im Auftrag
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in der Frühen Neuzeit e. V.
von Matthias Asche, Horst Carl, Marian Füssel,
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Markus Meumann / Andrea Pühringer (eds.)

The Military in the
Early Modern World

A Comparative Approach

With 4 figures

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Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg

Introduction and Commentary

1.   Markets of Violence and the 'Military Revolution': A New Military History of Eastern Europe

In the existing comparative European research on violence in the early modern period, Eastern Europe has thus far scarcely been conceived of as a separate region with its own structures. Approaches rooted in the theory of modernisation have tended to assume a delayed occurrence of the early modern 'military revolution' in Eastern Europe during the course of the seventeenth century: this spread gradually into the region from the Netherlands in the sixteenth century, initially via Swedish influences and carried by German, Dutch, French, and Scottish soldiers. As in Western Europe, it was accompanied by an expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus, an increase in the tax burden, wide-reaching financial reform, and the general permeation of Eastern European societies by the state.

These processes were seen to have taken place over the entire course of the seventeenth century for the Tsardom of Muscovy (Marshall Poe)[1] and Poland-Lithuania (Robert Frost);[2] for the former they culminated in a successful process of state formation, in that they led to the large-scale military and state reforms under Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century, whereas they proved to be unsuccessful in the latter case, which was 'punished' by partition and annexation.

However, when applied to the early modern period, these theories leave a great deal of questions requiring further clarification, and indeed even ignore certain

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1 Marshall Poe, The Consequences of the Military Revolution in Muscovy: A Comparative Perspective, in: Comparative Studies in Society and History 38 (1996), pp. 603–618; idem, The Military Revolution, Administrative Development and Cultural Change in Early Modern Russia, in: The Journal of Early Modern History 2 (1998), pp. 247–273.

2 Robert Frost, The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721, London 2000; idem, The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the "Military Revolution", in: Mieczysław B. Biskupski, James S. Pula (eds.), Poland and Europe: Historical Dimensions, New York 1993, pp. 19–47.

developments completely. After all, in what we are actually confronted with in Eastern Europe are developments pulling in the opposite direction, at least initially (into the first third of the seventeenth century), and with what has sometimes been characterised as the 'orientalisation' of warfare, that is a prioritisation of light cavalry and only using the infantry as an auxiliary force.[3] Before the eighteenth century, there is very little evidence in the region for the construction of early modern fortresses following the Italian model in (the so-called *trace italienne*), often connected with the 'military revolution'. It was only with the construction of the Novodvinsk Fortress in Archangelsk in 1701 and the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg in 1703 that these innovations in military architecture were finally adopted; Polish initiatives such as the Kudak Fortress (1635/39–1648) on the Dnieper close to present-day Dnipropetrovsk remain few and far between, and were abandoned as a result of financial crises,[4] whilst neither of the great Swedish fortresses at Sveaborg (1748-) and Svartholm (1749-) were constructed until the mid-eighteenth century.

Newer approaches, and in particular the anthology edited by Brian Davies in 2012, *Warfare in Eastern Europe*, tend to adopt a more revisionist approach to the theory of a 'military revolution' from the West. Crucial to an understanding of military developments in Eastern Europe, according to Davies, are the geographical and related social, demographic and infrastructural differences between the 'Baltic' and the '(Danubian-)Pontic Theatres of War'. The differing forms of warfare in these regions impacted accordingly upon the extent and range of the military transformations they experienced, i.e. the degree to which Western technologies and tactics were adopted in the Baltic Sea region and were implemented in Central Europe, that is in Ukraine and the Black Sea region. Furthermore, it was the Ottoman Empire which had been most influential over the centuries in shaping military affairs in Eastern Europe, so that the majority of innovations in the Muscovy of the sixteenth century had Ottoman rather than Western roots (artillery, the laager tactic, the Streltsy modelled on the Janissaries). Therefore, Davies considers it necessary not to speak in terms of a

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3 Vitalij V. Penskoj, Velikaja ognestrel'naja revolucija [The Great Gunpowder Revolution], Moscow 2010, pp. 64–72.

4 In essence denied for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in Bogusław Dybaś, Fortece Rzeczypospolitej. Studium z dziejów budowy fortyfikacji stałych w państwie polsko-litewskim w XVII wieku [Fortresses of the Rzeczpospolita. Study on the History of Constructing Permanent Fortifications in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Seventeenth Century], Toruń 1998; only single elements of *trace italienne* can be found in fortress construction in Moscow since the 1530s (Fortress Starodub); cf. Anatolij N. Kirpičnikov, Kreposti bastionnogo tipa v srednevekovoj Rossii [Fortifications of the Bastion type in Medieval Russia], Pamjatniki kul'tury. Novye otkrytija, Eżegodnik 1978; Leningrad 1979, pp. 471–499; Konstantin Nossov, Russian Fortresses 1480–1682, Oxford 2006; idem, Russkie kreposti konca 15–17 vv. [Russian Fortification from Late Fifteenth to Seventeenth Century], Sankt Petersburg 2009.

'military revolution' in Eastern Europe, but rather in terms of 'military adaptation'.[5]

The most recent comparative study on the 'military revolution' in the Ottoman Empire, Poland-Lithuania and the Muscovite Empire also highlights the particularities of the Eastern European 'theatre of war', whilst still maintaining a fundamentally state-centred position. However, in this position the 'military revolution' is reduced to a technological and tactical reform of the military, and in the final analysis its consequences were dependent on the assertiveness of the central authorities.[6] From the state-centred perspective of the late modern period, this master narrative possesses a certain plausibility since it can indicate those state structures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which these processes generally did prevail. However, it overlooks a central aspect of the 'military revolution', namely the close interrelationship between societal transformation, military-technological developments, and the accompanying expansion of the state's monopoly on violence, followed by geographical expansion.[7]

However, the concept of a 'military revolution', in the meantime also contentious in research on Western Europe,[8] does offer a point of contact to a further theory, in which the concept of the monopoly on violence also plays a central role, and which can improve our understanding of historical processes of violence in Eastern Europe. The theory of 'markets of violence', developed by Georg Elwert on the basis of African societies in the twentieth century, has thus far found little attention in European history,[9] but it does possess a great descriptive

5 Brian L. Davies, Introduction, in: idem (ed.), Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500–1800, Leiden 2012, pp. 1–18, here pp. 10–12. For the Ottoman Empire: Gábor Ágoston, Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450–1800, in: Journal of World History 25 (2014), pp. 85–124.

6 Penskoj, Velikaja ognestrel'naja revolucija (cf. note 3).

7 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, New York 1988; Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change. Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe, Princeton 1993.

8 Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800, London 1991.

9 Elwert suggests using the theory for early modern European history, but does not explain how in detail: "It is tempting to analyse early modern Europe and the period preceding the establishment of stable capitalism structures there under the same perspective", Georg Elwert, Markets of Violence, in: idem, Stephan Feuchtwang, Dieter Neubert (eds.), Dynamics of Violence. Processes of Escalation and De-Escalation in Violent Group Conflicts, Berlin 1999, pp. 85–102, here p. 88, note 4. An example for the application of this concept is Andreas Klein, Machtstrukturen auf einem Gewaltmarkt. Strukturen der Gewalt im anglo-schottischen Grenzland des 16. Jahrhunderts, in: Mathis Prange, Christine Reinle (eds.), Fehdehandeln im spätmittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Europa und Fehdegruppen, Göttingen 2014, pp. 61–91.

and analytical potential, and can be applied very well to the Eastern Europe of the early modern period. Elwert describes 'markets of violence' as

> economic fields dominated by civil war, warlords or robbery, in which a self-perpetu-ating system emerges which links non-violent commodity markets with the violent acquisition of goods. It is the profit implied in the entwined violent and non-violent forms of appropriation and exchange which is the guiding principle of action.[10]

Markets of violence can "emerge in spaces open to violence – *above all in the absence of a monopoly on violence*" (emphasis by the author).[11] The absence of a monopoly on violence is not enough in itself, however, and access to a functioning market economy is also required:

> When the market economy and spaces open to violence encounter each other, this can lead to a positive reaction: market interests enlarge the spaces open to violence and, in these spaces, interests are realised to a growing degree. Formulated more abstractly, a market of violence should be conceived of as an interaction shaped by the primary aims of acquisition, in which both robbery and the exchange of goods are present, as well as their transitional and combinational forms (such as ransom demands, road tolls, protection money etc.). In this the various forms of action are so closely linked to one another that, fundamentally, each actor has various options open to him, ranging from robbery to trade (that is to say, a pure trader is never faced by a pure robber) and that, on the other hand, a self-stabilising system of action (albeit a conflictual one) emerges.[12]

Markets of violence generally only last for one or two decades, until they are brought to a standstill through internal (the exhaustion of resources) or external factors (trade blockades or the establishment of a monopoly of/on violence).

Since the two concepts mentioned above both draw upon the idea of the monopoly on violence, it seems worthwhile here to investigate this idea from a historical perspective, and thereby also to reconsider the longer-standing history of violence in Eastern Europe in the area of tension between the monopoly on violence, markets of violence and communities of violence.

2.   A History of Violence in Eastern Europe

In Eastern Europe we are confronted by two focal points of conflict and by a continuous history of violence and war: the Baltic region, and above all the Baltic territories (Livonia), as a theatre of war (Nordic Wars), and Ukraine as a central market of violence. Despite the interrelationship between Livonia and Ukraine

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10 Elwert, Markets of Violence (cf. note 9), p. 86.
11 Idem, Gewaltmärkte. Beobachtungen zur Zweckrationalität der Gewalt, in: Trutz von Trotha (ed.), Soziologie der Gewalt, Opladen 1997, pp. 86–101, here p. 88.
12 Ibid.

discussed above by Davies, the respective structures of violence in these two areas were typologically different: despite decade long conflicts and the existing points of connection to global markets through the Hanseatic League, one does not find any markets of violence on the Baltic coast. This is for two primary reasons: firstly, there were no real goods which were easy to acquire and transport and that could have satisfied the potential needs of such a market; secondly, the permanent struggle between the neighbouring powers over Livonia meant that a power vacuum never emerged here: rather, the competing states were constantly striving to bind the region to themselves on a long-term basis and to develop it administratively, and particularly in the case of Sweden we can see a paradigm of the 'fiscal-military state'.[13]

In the northern Black Sea region a completely different constellation of power dominated. The area between the Dniester and the Dnieper rivers, almost completely depopulated following the Mongol invasions of the mid-thirteenth century, was transformed into a wasteland of sorts, which came to be known as the 'Wild Fields'. Tatar war parties regularly crossed these steppes on their plunder and abduction raids to the North. From the fifteenth century at the latest, one can find evidence of settlement from the Ruthenian regions of Poland-Lithuanian and from Muscovite lands, consisting for the large part of runaway peasants and outlaws. These set up their homes in small groups on the banks of rivers, followed a semi-nomadic existence,[14] and appropriated for themselves the Turkic word *kazak* (Cossack) from the Turkic-speaking steppe-raiders already living there. These too were composed of expellees and fugitives who had been ejected or had fled from their tribal or client federations in the context of the various tribal and succession conflicts among the Golden Horde and its successors, but from time to time they also fell under the loose dominion/control of the Crimean Khanate.[15] As Mihnea Berindei has pointed out, in the sixteenth century on both the Ottoman and the Polish side, the term *kazak* was not yet ethnically-connoted, and referred primarily to brigands and secondarily to a type of irregular (border) troops. Accordingly, the Tatars and the Nogais in the Budjak were still referred to as *kazak* in the second half of the sixteenth century.[16] Even at a later date, Tatar

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13 Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe. Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500–1660, London/New York 2002, pp. 174–212.

14 The Polish chronicler Marcin Bielski mentions the Cossacks on the Dniepr for the first time in the year 1486. Józef Turowski (ed.), Kronika Marcina Bielskiego, vol. 2, Sanok 1856, p. 882; he also gives the first description of the Zaporogian Cossacks: Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1358–1361.

15 Yücel Öztürk, Özü'den Tuna'ya Kazaklar [The Cossacks from the Dniepr to the Danube river], Istanbul 2004, pp. 214 s.

16 Mihnea Berindei, Le problème des "Cosaques" dans la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle, in: Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 13 (1972), pp. 338–367. Cf. also Andrzej Dziubiński, La province turque d'Aqkerman – nouveau facteur politique et économique sur les confins

defectors can still be found among the ranks of the predominantly Slavic-speaking, Orthodox Cossacks.

From the outset, these small communities, existing beyond the reach of Tatar suzerainty, had to defend themselves against the Tatars,[17] but it would require two 'war entrepreneurs' for the Cossacks to permanently establish themselves militarily in the middle of the sixteenth century: Bernhard von Prittwitz (1500–1561) and Dmytro Vyshnevetsky. Prittwitz, a Silesian nobleman from the German-Polish border region around Groß-Wartenburg and Schildberg in Polish-Lithuanian service, recruited a private troop of Cossacks at the end of the 1530s, primarily in order to defend his own estates and the office entrusted to him as Starost of Bar in Podolia from Tatar raids. From 1540 onwards however, he himself began to cross regularly into Tatar territories and to take a rich booty, also of people. According to Andrzej Dziubiński, this change of strategy was based upon the initiative of the Hetman Jan Tarnowski, who in his youth had fought on the side of the Portuguese against the Berbers, and who now wished to see these Portuguese tactics applied in the Ukraine.[18]

His contemporary Vyshnevetsky (Vyšnevec'kyj, died 1564) was not only considered to be the founder of the Zaporozhian Sich but also laid the foundations of the Cossack mercenaries, in that he attempted to sell his services not only to Poland-Lithuania, the Tsar of Muscovy and the Moldavian nobility, but also to the Ottoman Sultan.[19] Both Prittwitz and Vyshnevetsky were to gain recognition as defenders of the borders against Tatar raids and abductions – a role which the forces of the state were unable to fulfil themselves. As Peter Lock has written:

> Spaces open to violence, from which the state has either withdrawn voluntarily, or has been forced to do so, can be opened up not only to criminal organisations, but also to private security forces – and the boundary between the two can often be somewhat fluid.[20]

méridionaux de l'Etat polono-lituanien au XVIᵉ siècle, in: Revue Roumaine d'Histoire 35 (1996), pp. 137–148, here pp. 140, 144.

17 Cf. Elwerts thesis on Africa: "Sedentary peasants had to enter the military structure as mercenaries, serfs or as self-defending communities, if they wanted to avoid slavery". Elwert, Markets of Violence (cf. note 9), p. 86.

18 Andrzej Dziubiński, Polsko-litewski napady na tureckie pogranicze czarnomorskie w epoce dwu ostatnich Jagiellonów [Polish-Lithuanian Raids on the Ottoman Black Sea Border in the Times of the Two Last Jagiellonian Rulers], in: Kwartalnik Historyczny 103/3 (1996), pp. 53–87, here pp. 55–57.

19 The latest biography: Oleg Ju. Kuznecov, Rycar′ Dikogo polja. Knjaz′ D.vI. Višneveckij, Moscow 2013; Vyshnevetsky as a military entrepreneur: Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Un condottiere lithuanien du XVIᵉ siècle: Le prince Dimitrij Višneveckij et l'origine de la Seč Zaporogue d'après les Archives ottomanes, in: Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique 10 (1969), pp. 257–279.

20 Peter Lock, Sicherheit à la carte? Entstaatlichung, Gewaltmärkte und Privatisierung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols, in: Tanja Brühl et al. (eds.), Die Privatisierung der Weltpolitik,

The motivations shaping the actions of both the Cossack and the Tatar armed groups were primarily dictated by the global market,[21] with which they had a reciprocal relationship. On the one hand, they required a sales market for their loot and for their military services; on the other hand, "the logistics of military operations, even those on a low-scale, were dependent upon international commodity flows, such as the flow of munitions".[22] In the mid-sixteenth century, the Lithuanian chronicler Michalon Litwin described how countless ships from the opposite shore of the Black Sea would supply the Tatars with weapons, clothing and horses. And if an ordinary horseman did not have any slaves to sell,

> then he committed himself for his part, on a contractual basis, to remunerate this person by a certain date for the weaponry, clothing and live horses he had received likewise with living beings, but not with horses, rather with a certain number of people of our own blood. And these oaths were always fulfilled, as if they always had our people ready and waiting in a stockyard.[23]

Politically, such military entrepreneurs only enjoyed limited support: in the aftermath of several serious raiding expeditions into Ottoman territory conducted during the Persian campaigns of Suleiman in 1548/1549, Prittwitz was accused of jeopardising the newly-agreed peace with the Ottomans, reached following the death of Sigismund, and felt himself obliged to defend his actions by reading a memorandum in front of the senate.[24] He stated that the Ottomans themselves had broken the peace, since the superficially Tatar raids were backed by Ottoman merchants, and that 'Turks', that is Ottomans, had also joined in the raiding parties. Thus, the memorandum stated:

> And Turks deigned to go with them [the Tatars] and also sent their servants with them, and others gave the Tatars horses for half of the bounty, as they continue to do today. And how well that suits them, since they enrich themselves greatly thereby: since what the Tatar managed to grab hold of with the aid of the horses, of this he had to give a half

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Entstaatlichung und Kommerzialisierung im Globalisierungsprozess, Bonn 2001, pp. 82–103, p. 211.

21 Idem: "Die Bühne, auf der Parteien bewaffneter Konflikte um des Überleben willens eine Rolle finden müssen, ist die Weltwirtschaft." Cited by Thomas Eppacher, Private Sicherheits- und Militärfirmen. Wesen, Wirken und Fähigkeiten, Berlin 2012, p. 243.

22 Ibid., p. 242.

23 Michalonis Lituani, De moribus tartarorum, lituanorum et moscorum, Fragmina X, Basel 1615, pp. 10 s: "[…] promittit in contractibus creditori quilibet numeraturum se ad certum diem pro vestibus, armis, et equis vivacioribus, vivaces etiam, verum non equos, sed homines, eosque sanguinis nostri. Et statur huiusmodi promissis eorum secure, perinde ac si in vivariis, et cortibus suis reclusos semper habeant illi homines nostros".

24 For detailed information about Prittwitz cf. Dziubiński, Polsko-Litewskie Napady (cf. note 18) as well as Gilles Veinstein, Prélude au problème cosaque [À travers les registres de dommages ottomans des années 1545–1555], in: Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 30 (1989), pp. 329–361.

to the Turk, and the second half was bought by the Turk for as much as he wanted to pay, and he took the horses back.[25]

The practice of loaning the poor Tatars horses and armour for their raids and thereby keeping a portion of their loot in return had a long tradition in the Eurasian steppe, and can be evidenced by numerous other examples.[26]

However, trade in looted cattle was not the only 'Ukrainian' branch of economic activity that Prittwitz participated in. He was also supposedly the first person to attempt to sell Cossacks as mercenaries to another European ruler (Albrecht of Prussia).[27] The case (study) of Prittwitz demonstrates clearly how the Ottoman slave trade, under the specific conditions of the Ukrainian 'market of violence' could elicit related economic rationales on the Polish side of the border, which were however directed towards other sales markets (European cattle market).

As the example of cooperation between Tatar slavers and Ottoman merchants outlined by Prittwitz shows, the phenomenon of the large-scale enslavement of Eastern European people in the early modern period is well known. After all, the global assertion of the internationalism 'slave' – derived from the 'Slavs', the majority population in Eastern Europe – is closely interconnected to the large numbers of Slavic slaves in the entire Ottoman Empire and in the Mediterranean region as late as the early modern period. It is difficult to establish precise figures, however various estimations suggest a figure of ca. 2 million enslaved people from Eastern Europe, traded and sold over and around the Black Sea between 1500 and 1700.[28] During this era, therefore, the Eastern European slave trade surpassed the transatlantic slave trade in size.

In the older research, as well as in some current journal articles, this phenomenon has often been explained through the idea of a clash of Islamic 'slave-holding societies' with the Eastern European great powers of Poland-Lithuania and Russia, with the Ukraine – literally the lands 'on the borders' – made to seem

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25 Andrzej Tomczak, Memoriał Bernarda Pretwicza do Króla z 1550 r., in: Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości 4 (1960), pp. 328–357, here p. 343, cf. also p. 345.

26 Jędrzej Taranowski, Krótkie wypisanie drogi z Polski do Konstantynopola, a z tamtąd zaś do Astrachania […], in: Józef Ignacy Kraszewski (ed.), Podróże i poselstwa polskie do Turcyi […], Krakau 1860, pp. 41–63, here p. 55; Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Le six voyages de Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Ecuyer Baron d'Aubonne qui'il a fait en Turquie, en Perse et aux Indes, Paris 1676, p. 341.

27 Dziubiński, Polsko-Litewskie Napady (cf. note 18), p. 81.

28 Mikhail B. Kizilov, The Black Sea and the Slave Trade: The Role of Crimean Maritime Towns in the Trade of Slaves and Captives in the Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, in: International Journal of Maritime History 17 (2005), pp. 211–235; Dariusz Kołodziejcyzk, Slave Hunting and Slave Redemption as a Business Enterprise: The Northern Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth to Seventeenth Centuries, in: Ebru Boyar, Kate Fleet (eds.), The Ottomans and Trade, Roma 2006, pp. 149–159.

an uncontrollable area of violence. At the same time, 'parasitical groupings' such as the Crimean Khanate enriched themselves on the slave trade whilst, in the final analysis, 'progressive powers' such as Russia brought progress (Soviet historiography).[29]

By contrast, however, more recent research has emphasised the role of regional groups of violence such as the Tatars – and on the other side the Cossacks – as well as the initially Genoese and later (aside from Moldavian intermezzos in the Danube and Dniester estuaries) Ottoman Black Sea cities (Kilia, Akkerman, Kaffa, Očakiv etc.), which participated in the slave trade and its revenues for reasons of rational calculation. Smaller armed groups, largely Tatar but sometimes ethnically mixed, and known in Ottoman as *beş baş* (five heads), were also constantly engaged in the trafficking of people from the present-day Dobruja and Budjak regions (today part of Bulgaria and Romania on the Black Sea coast) (ca. 1,000 slaves per year).[30] As a result of the easily negotiable distance between these groups of violence and densely populated rural regions – ca. 500 km between the northern and north western Black Sea Region and Red Ruthenia to the east and southeast of L'wów – practices of kidnapping took place predominantly in this region. International trade routes running through the region also meant that metal products and weapons were easily accessible, further encouraging violent conflict.[31] The Polish crown was also involved in slave trading,[32] and in 1532 they issued a letter of consignment to the Jews of L'wów, entitling them to sell 'guilty youths' to the Ottoman Empire.[33] Similar procedures by regional administrations, i.e. the selling of persons into slavery, can also be found in Red Ruthenian court proceedings. Transnational merchant elites such as Armenian, Jewish and, particularly in the seventeenth century, Ottoman traders[34] were also

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29 Vitalij V. Tichonov, Rasprodaža solnečnoj zdravnicy. Boi zu istoriju Kryma v poslevoennom SSSR [The Sell-Out of the Sunny Spa Towns. The Struggle for the History of the Crimea in Post-War UdSSR], in: Rodina 1 (2015), pp. 152 s.

30 Andrzej Dziubiński, Handel niewolnikami polskimi i ruskimi w Turcji w 16 w. i jego organizacja' [The Trade with Polish and Russian Slaves in Turkey in the Sixteenth Century and Its Structure], in: Zeszyty historyczne uniwersytety Warszawskiego 3 (1963), pp. 36–49.

31 Georg Elwert, Stephan Feuchtwang, Dieter Neubert, The Dynamics of Collective Violence – an Introduction, in: idem (eds.), Dynamics of Violence (cf. note 9), pp. 9–31, here pp. 12–14 about "warring and oscillating violence".

32 Andrzej Dziubiński, Na szlakach Orientu. Handel między Polską a Imperium Osmańskim w XVI–XVIII wieku, Warsaw 1997, especially the chapter "Slave Trade", pp. 203–216.

33 Safe conduct (Salvus conductus) from 18th June 1532 "ac item abducere in Turciam et illic in servitutem vendere aliquot iuvenes inculpato"; Tadeusz Wierzbowski, Matricularum Regni Poloniae summaria, vol. 2, Warsaw 1907, p. 421.

34 See for examples Dziubiński, Na szlakach Orientu (cf. note 32), pp. 204–206; Mikhail B. Kizilov, Slaves, Money Lenders, and Prisoner Guards: The Jews and the Trade in Slaves and Captives in the Crimean Khanate, in: Journal of Jewish Studies 58 (2007), pp. 189–210.

involved both in the concealed slave trade and in mediating ransoms, as too were Cossacks.

Cooperation between competing groups of violence in the Ukraine was even clearer during the large war campaigns of 1649, 1653, 1660, and 1667, in which Tatar groups were allied with Cossack or Polish troops, and which each ended with formal ceasefires that entitled the Tatars to depart with their human bounty.[35] The German Hieronymus Holsten, a mercenary in Polish service, described the capture of Russian soldiers following a blockade by Polish troops in the autumn of 1660 in the following terms:

> But oh people! How the paroles were now issued the whole evening, and it was ordered that no accord should be reached with the Muscovites. The most important were taken under arrest, and the rest were to be handed over to the Tatars or put to the sword […] and various Tatars had gathered by me to this end, who took my Muscovites captive. That morning over a thousand lay naked and slaughtered on the Maidan (square) and between our huts […]. The Tatars had by then taken 8,000 prisoner and thus, since it was already late in winter, they went to their Tartary. Meanwhile I got the Muscovite wagons and [had] gained from so many exquisite things that I was therefore over 1,000 [Thaler] richer as a result.[36]

It is difficult to calculate the importance of the slave trade for the communities of violence in the Ukraine – what is indisputable is the fundamental importance of the slave trade for the Black Sea Tatars, for whom roughly equal sources of revenue have been postulated, drawn from war booty (as a rule in Ottoman service), slave trading, and agricultural sources of income. Less clear, but not to be underestimated, was its role as a hidden source of revenue for other groups of violence in the region (not only through direct sale, but also through the arranging of ransoms, the transfer of news and messages, and stealing from captives). Furthermore, the slave trade also encouraged violent practices through the promotion of a high degree of mobility, on which success depended, and the development of financially strong enterprises.

Central for the utilisation of the Tatars by the Ottomans was the fact that, here, a traditional booty economy, which had always operated without salaries, came into contact with significant changes in the classical Ottoman military system (that is Janissaries and *Sipahis*), such as occurred following the Battle of Me-zőkeresztes/Haçova in 1596.[37] The assessment of the changing role of the Jan-

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35 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, Slave Hunting and Slave Redemption as a Business Enterprise: The Northern Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth to Seventeenth Centuries, in: Oriente Moderno, Nuova serie 86/1 (2006), pp. 149–159, here p. 153.

36 Kriegsabenteuer des Rittmeisters Hieronymus Christian von Holsten 1655–1666, ed. by Helmut Lahrkamp, Wiesbaden 1971, pp. 36 s.

37 Öktay Özel, The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c. 1550–1700, in: Christine Woodhead (ed.), The Ottoman World, New York 2012, pp. 184–204, here p. 189. The Ottoman reaction led to a military

issaries is disputed in research on the subject and, in this volume, Rhoads Murphey proposes a new interpretation for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In summary: through the slave trade, early modern market economies, shaped by the demand from Istanbul and the Mediterranean region, encountered spaces open to violence. The Tatar groups were opposed to the Cossacks, who were initially implemented as security forces, but who became increasingly independent, and themselves fell under the sway of the market of violence, in that they also turned their hand to kidnapping, ransom demands, and frequent changes of allegiance.

3. Communities of Violence in Eastern Europe (Cossacks, Tatars)

The emergence of a market of violence in the Northern Black Sea area had wide-ranging consequences for the entire Eastern European region in the early modern period. The first and most immediate of these was expansion, founded upon robbery: both the Cossacks and the Tatars looted goods from neighbouring areas, which were often subject to the suzerainty of state authorities (land and sea raids).[38] Furthermore, the two federations took advantage of the era of political instability in order to transform the central areas of the neighbouring states, on a short-term basis, into structures akin to markets of violence (during the *Smuta* from 1606 to 1613/1618 in the Muscovite Empire, and the Khmelnytsky uprising and the following crisis in the *Potop* of 1648–1660 in Poland-Lithuania).

At the same time, however, this market of violence also constituted possibly the largest market for mercenaries in the early modern period. It was not only the formal sovereigns over these areas, such as Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire, who called upon the services of the Cossacks and the Tatars. At various times the Muscovite Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian nobility, Moldavian and Wallachian rulers, Swedish generals, and even Holy Roman Emperors and French

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decentralization and, consequently, to its re-ethnicisation, or rather its re-tribalization. Exemplary for this is the increased recourse to the Tatars cf. Gabor Ágoston, Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800, in: Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 12/2 (2011), pp. 281–319; Virginia Aksan, Ottoman Ethnographies of Warfare, 1500–1800, in: Wayne E. Lee (ed.), Empires and Indigenes. Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion and Warfare in the Early Modern World, New York 2011, pp. 141–163; and Joseph Fletcher, Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition, in: Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3/4 (1979/80), pp. 236–251.

38 Daria Starčenko, Verheerende Geschwindigkeit – Zweckrationalität von Gewalt. See-Expeditionen und (Beute-) Kriege bei polnisch-litauischen Kosaken am Beispiel der Khotin-Kampagne 1621, in: Horst Carl, Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg (eds.), Lohn der Gewalt. Beutepraktiken von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit, Paderborn 2011, pp. 167–199.

Kings took advantage of the military skills offered by these mercenaries.[39] Above all, it was the never-ending series of small-scale conflicts and also the absence of a monopoly of violence which rendered the Cossacks and the Tatars such valuable warriors, and they can be characterised accurately as 'marginal area soldiers'.[40]

These relations also shaped practices of violence in the wider region, since fiscal-military states (Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, and later also Prussia) remained marginal in Eastern Europe (and repeatedly failed in their expansionist tendencies as a result of shortages of resources and infrastructural problems). By contrast, what dominated was the recruitment of groups of violence through the promise of booty, to which remaining payments and final discharges were also linked. These groups constituted, especially in the seventeenth century, a market for violence and mercenaries which was largely able to provide for itself, and violent phenomena occurred accumulatively following military campaigns and the disbanding of these associations (e.g. the Cossacks in 1625 and 1637).[41]

Fundamentally, one should not conceive of these associations of violence and loot as ethnically unified – an ethnic homogeneity was only attributed to them by the descriptions of outsiders.[42] The 'Polish Riders' (1607–1626) were seen re-

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39 George Gajecki, Alexander Baran, The Cossacks in the Thirty Years' War, vol. 1–2, Roma 1969–1983; Aleksandr L. Stanislavskij, Graždanskaja vojna v Rossii 17 v.: Kazačestvo na perelome istorii, Moscow 1990; Andrij V. Fedoruk, Najmane kozacʹke vijsʹko (16 – seredyna 17 st.). Ideologija, organizacija ta vijsʹkove mystectvo, PhD thesis Černihiv 2000.

40 Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam: Genesis of the Military System, New Haven 1981, pp. 75–86, here p. 77: "Several elements contributed to the recurrent military superiority of marginal area soldiers: the hardships of their way of life, their healthiness, and their social organization; the fact that no government controlled them was of key importance."

41 Daria Starčenko, Kosaken zwischen Tatendrang und Rechtfertigungsdruck. Ordnungsvorstellungen einer Gewaltgemeinschaft im Kontext von Konkurrenz und Gewaltkultur, in: Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung 60 (2011), pp. 494–518.

42 Perceived as an ethnic group like for example the Walloons: Allerunderthänigste Supplication, Etlicher NiederOesterreichischen Landständ An Die Kayserliche Mayestät: Daraus das Grawsamb, Unmenschlich, und Barbarisch Tyrannisieren des Kayserlichen Kriegsvolcks, sonderlich der Cosaggen und Walonen wieder dieselbe Land, zu sehen ist, s.l. 1620. Even European scholars came to a similar conclusion: The university of Jena asked in March 1622 to avert the upcoming marching-through of "ein Anzahl Wallonen und Coßagken", which "diese Fürstenthumb zuverheeren und in die Asche zulegen vorhabens sein", because "durch die Grausamkeit dieser Völcker nicht so sehr die Region, als unsere wahre und allein seligmachende Religion |: welcher sie von Herzen Feindt : in Gefahr gesetzet werden möchte". Rector und Professores der Universitet Jena an Herzog Johann Philipp von Sachsen-Altenburg, 9th March 1622; Staatsarchiv Dresden, 10024 Geheimer Rat, Loc. 9195/3, S. 274. Sometimes synonymic to Poles: "die Polen oder Cosacken", so Boudewijn de Jonge, Expeditiones Caesareo-Bvqvoianae: Das ist, Warhafft vnd eigentliche Beschreibung alles dessen was durch den Herren Grafen von Bucquoy, etc. Keyserlicher Maiestät Kriegsheers Generalen, bey wehrender Vnruh in Böhenn, Österreich, Mehren vnnd Vngaren verrichtet worden: Darinn sonderlich der gantze Verlauff der Pragerischen Schlacht grundt, vnnd außführlich angezeigt wirdt; Endlich welcher gestalt Wollgemelter Graf in Vngaren Ritterlich sein Leben geendet, s.l. 1621, p. 59.

spectively in the Grand Duchy of Moscow as 'Lithuanians' and 'Poles', in Poland as 'Russians' or 'Lithuanians', and in German-language sources in the Holy Roman Empire as 'Cossacks' or even as 'Croatians'![43] In Tatar groups could also be found Moldavians and Wallachians,[44] Turks, Hungarians, and Cossacks (the so-called *kardeş kazak* – Brother Cossacks). The Transylvanian chronicler Georg Kraus recorded that the Hungarians, Moldavians, Wallachians, and Germans who accompanied the Tatars on their Moravian campaign of 1663 would call out names in Czech, German, and Hungarian in the woods in order to draw out the local population who were hiding there.[45] 'Paul the Cossack', a Tatar spy with Polish-Lithuanian roots captured in 1663, reporting on his own career, stated that in the Tatar units there were also German soldiers, who had previously been in the service of Brandenburg.[46]

It is evident from this that these groups had considerable room for action, which can only be explained through high levels of mobility and the use of resources of the market and violence. These communities of violence therefore constituted, at least in the two centuries before the Great Northern War, a central and autonomous factor in the history of the military and violence in Eastern Europe.

These groupings also left long-lasting traces upon Western European military history. The Cossacks were esteemed as light cavalry in the Thirty Years' War, for example by Wallenstein, and contributed considerably to the establishment of this branch of the military in the western armies.[47] A further Cossack contribution were the lightweight boats, the so-called *čajkas*, successfully deployed by Poland in the Baltic and by Peter I against the Swedish fleet in the early eighteenth century.[48]

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43 Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, Strukturen einer mobilen Gewaltgemeinschaft im östlichen Europa. Der polnisch-litauische Freireiterverband der "Lisowczycy" von der Entstehung im Moskauer Reich bis zur gewaltsamen Auflösung durch den polnisch-litauischen Reichstag (1607–1626), in: Winfried Speitkamp (ed.), Gewaltgemeinschaften. Von der Spätantike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2013, pp. 185–208, here p. 196.

44 Victor Ostapchuk, The Ottoman Black Sea frontier and the Relations of the Porte with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, 1622–1628, PhD thesis Cambridge, MA 1989, p. 44; Andrzej Gliwa, Kraina upartych niepogód. Zniszczenia wojenne na obszarze ziemy przemyskiej w XVII wieku [The Land of Persistent Bad Weather. War Destruction in the Przemyśl Land in the Seventeenth Century], Przemyśl 2013, pp. 106, 269.

45 Georg Kraus, Siebenbürgische Chronik des Schässburger Stadtschreibers Georg Kraus: 1608–1665, vol. 2, Vienna 1864, p. 350 (for the year 1663).

46 Mária Ivanics, Krimtatarische Spionage im osmanisch-habsburgischen Grenzgebiet während des Feldzuges im Jahre 1663, in: Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 61 (2008), pp. 1 s., 119–133.

47 Osip L. Wajnštejn, Rossija i Tridcatiletnjaja vojna [Russia and the Thirty Years' War], Moscow 1947, p. 80; Gajecky, Baran, The Cossacks (cf. note 39), vol. 2, pp. 60–67.

48 Agnieszka Biedrzycka, Wojsko J.K.M. Zaporoskie nad Bałtykiem. Próby wykorzystania Kozaków w walce ze Szwecją w I połowie XVII wieku (do roku 1635) [The Zaprogian Armed

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4.   Western Specialists in Eastern European Communities of Violence

The market of violence which was the Ukraine therefore impacted greatly upon the entire region, and its influence could be felt as far away as Western Europe. However, it was itself also subject to dramatic and sometimes fatal western influences. These can be found above all on the personal level, but also on the related technological and military-administrative levels.

Firstly, one should mention the increasing use of gunpowder. This harbinger of the military revolution placed a highly efficient weapon for defence into the hands of the dispersed Cossack groups, with which they were quickly able to establish themselves as meaningful actors in the region. The Cossacks – contrary to popular belief – predominantly fought as infantry soldiers up to the 1620s, and proved to be successful against their mounted opponents thanks to their tactics of barricading themselves inside a stronghold or a circle of wagons and fending off the attack with dense rifle fire.[49] It was gunpowder which made the emergence of the Cossack communities of violence, and thus the structural stabilisation of the market of violence, possible in the first place.[50]

Such processes of knowledge transfer can be attributed to a great extent to certain individual foreign persons (such as the aforementioned Prittwitz or Vyshnevetsky), but direct Cossack involvement in European conflicts as mercenaries also contributed. Questions concerning the political and cultural consequences may well remain hotly contested,[51] but what appears to be indisputable in any case is a transformation in the tactics of the Cossack forces, namely the rapid increase in importance of the cavalry.

Forces on the Baltic Sea. Attempts to Deploy the Cossacks in the Fight against the Swedes in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century (until 1635)], in: Przegląd Gdański 59 (1999), pp. 19–32; Maciej Franz, Zaporožskie kazaki v bor'be za Pribaltiku [Zaporogian Cossacks in combat on the Baltic], in: Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana 1 (2014), pp. 88–97.

49 The army of the Ottoman-Tatars besieged the camp of the Cossacks near Chocim six times in 1621, but without success: Pauli Żegota (ed.), Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej r. 1621 [Memories of the Expedition to Chocim in 1621], Cracow 1853.

50 Serhii Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine, New York 2001, p. 30: "The growth of the Cossacks' military significance in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and the success of their struggle with the Tatars were due at least in part to the military revolution that swept Europe in the early modern period. […] As infantrymen bearing firearms displaced mounted warriors armed with swords, lances, or bows, the Ukrainian Cossacks, who were predominantly infantrymen, became more successful in their struggle with the steppe nomads and the Crimean Tatars, who fought mainly on horseback. The use of gunpowder should therefore be regarded as one of the major preconditions for the colonization of the Ukrainian steppe and the growing power of Ukrainian Cossackdom".

51 Gajecki, Baran, The Cossacks (cf. note 39), vol. 2, pp. 75–79.

Alongside this process, North West European entrepreneurs of violence, trained and schooled in places such as the Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire, could establish themselves at the summit of smaller regiments as sought-after experts. In Eastern Europe, such 'modern' units were called upon to combat semi-nomadic communities of violence, and it was hoped that they would finally come up with effective strategies in this regard. Various ethnic attributions such as 'Germans' or 'Scots' can be found in references to these experts, and it should be emphasised, therefore, that we are dealing here with groups which were fundamentally ethnically diverse.

In an overview of the specialists operating in Eastern Europe, one group in particular stands out, and it is one which has usually been better known from a German perspective as stationary and noble, and rarely investigated as specialists in violence. This is the group of minor nobles and military contractors situated round the Baltic Sea, in Pomerania, in Prussia and Livonia. The Eastern and South Eastern Baltic Coast, in particular historical Old Livonia, but also the Prussian lands constituted a grey zone of fracture between condensed centralised states with significant military apparatuses.

In Eastern Europe, the Livonian and Baltic entrepreneurs of violence often acted as captains or members of mercenary groups with ethnic label, namely the 'German regiments' or 'German riders'. These groups of violence were seen as 'Western European', and there are certainly parallels to the Croatian and 'Polish or Cossack riders' in the Thirty Years' War. Ethnic labels operated in similar ways, and there were also similar problems of communication. It is perhaps not without a certain irony that it was believed, both in the east and the west of Europe, that the 'true' experts in violence came from elsewhere, and were strangers.

The 'German' units basically operated similarly to local groupings, plundering and enriching themselves in the same way. Holsten himself claimed that "he who at that time could pilfer the most was the best soldier",[52] and they seized not only goods, but also people. "The best loot I made was 4 large oxen and a young Hungarian noble girl of 14 years, whom I dressed like a Polish boy".[53] It is unclear what happened to the girl, and whether or not she was ransomed for money.[54] In several passages, Holsten also graphically describes rape scenes, in which he himself also participated as a perpetrator. In terms of the actual practices of violence, western and eastern specialists were equal to each other.

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52 Ibid., p. 20.
53 Ibid., p. 21.
54 Karol Żojdź, Przeciwko moralności, czy dyscyplinie? Przestępstwa seksualne popełniane przez żołnierzy koronnych i litewskich w XVII [Against Morals or Discipline? Sex Crime Committed by Polish-Lithuanian Soldiers in the Seventeenth Century], in: Zbigniew Hundert et al. (eds.), Studia nad staropolską sztuką wojenną, vol. 3, Oświęcim 2014, pp. 95–112, here pp. 104 s.

However, the increasing deployment of Western European mercenaries by Poland-Lithuania following Wladyslaw IV's military reforms of 1630 only brought about minor structural changes in the Polish-Lithuanian army. Time and again in their struggles against the Cossacks and Moscow, Warsaw and individual magnates called upon tried-and-tested recruitment practices, in which entire mercenary regiments were hired only for the duration of the campaign – a practice which the other emerging regional power, the Muscovite Empire, declined to use at the time. In this respect, it is interesting to compare and contrast Holsten's striking testimony with that of a Scottish officer in Russian service.[55]

Patrick Leopold Gordon of Auchleuchries (1635–1699) came from an aristocratic Scottish family, but he left his homeland, which was deteriorating into civil war, at the age of 16, and in 1655 he enlisted as a cavalryman in Swedish service. One year later he transferred to the Polish army in which, like Holsten, he served under Jerzy Lubomirski, and he remained for five years, despite intense Russian courtship of his services. Following his release, he did finally decide for Moscow, entering into service here in 1661 alongside three further Scottish officers.

Gordon was by no means the first Scot in the Muscovite army. By the time he joined, three of his compatriots already held the rank of general: Alexander Leslie (died 1663), Thomas Dalyell (1615–1685) and William Drummond (ca. 1617–1688).[56] Their role was not only direct military command, but also to train the regiments under their supervision: when Dalyell and Drummond returned to Scotland in 1666 they were praised among other things in their farewell for having led their soldiers in battle and for instructing them well.[57] Gordon was therefore also expected to demonstrate his ability in handling weapons, and this test was conducted personally by the step-father of the Tsar himself, I. D. Miloslavsky:

> Being come into field, wee found the Boyar [Miloslavsky] there before us, who ordered us to take up pike und musquets (being there ready) and show how wee could handle our arms; wherewith being surprized, I told hin, if I had knowne of this, I should have brought forth one of my boyes, who perhaps could handle armes better as I myself; adding, that it was the least part of an officer to know how to handle armes, conduct being the most materiall. Whereat, he, taking me up short, told me, that the best colonell comeing into this country must to do so; to which I replyed, Seing it is the fashion, I am

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55 Passages from the Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries A.D. 1635–A.D.1699, Aberdeen 1869.

56 Aleksandr A. Rogožin, Generalitet polkov "novogo stroja" v Rossii vtoroj poloviny 17 veka, [The Generals of the Units of the "New Type" in Russia in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century], PhD thesis Orel 2014, p. 56.

57 Sobranie gosudarstvennych gramot i dogovorov [Collection of National Documents and Treaties], vol. 4, nr. 39, Moscow 1826, pp. 143 s.

content. And so having handled the pike and musket, with al there postures, to his great satisfaction, I returned.[58]

Two days later Gordon discovered that he had been accepted into the rank of major in the service of the Tsar, and one week after this

> I gott orders to receive from a Russe seven hundred men, where to be in our regiment, being runneway sojours out of severall regiments, and fetched back from diverse places. […I] exercised these souldiers twice in a day in faire weather.[59]

Over the next five years, weapons training was to be his main task, as was the norm for a foreign officer in Russian service. Gordon wrote that he had to drill the regiment twice daily, and furthermore that no day went by when he did not receive new soldiers or have to send others back to the various garrisons and regiments to which they belonged.

Like those of Holsten, Gordon's memoirs also provide vivid descriptions of outbreaks of violence, but the context was completely different. When a Russian captain in his regiment caught the soldiers playing cards at night, he not only confiscated all the money, but also blackmailed them, on threat of prosecution, for a further 60 roubles. When this was reported to Gordon on the following day, he

> sent for him in the evening, and, haveing dispatched the guard and my servants, all exept one, out of the way, he being come into the roome, I began to expostulate with him, telling him, that I could not suffer such abuses any longer, and that I would break his neck one tyme or another. Whereat he beginning to storme, I got him by the head, and flinging him downe, with a fresh, short, oaken endgell, I so belaboured his back and sides, that he was scarce able to rise; whereupon, telling him that I would break his neck if he played such tricks hereafter, I packed him out of doores.[60]

In 1667, Gordon was transferred to Sevsk,[61] the largest military and administrative centre of the Tsarist Empire on the border of the steppe. Here he occupied himself with fortress construction and military administration, and recruited a dragoon regiment, with whom he successfully fought in the Ukraine against the Ottomans and the pro-Ottoman Hetman Petro Doroshenko between 1674 and 1678.[62] This was followed by his appointment as Commander of Kiev in 1678, where he was entrusted with fortifying the city. In fulfilling this task he

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58 Gordon, Diary (cf. note 55), p. 44.
59 Ibid., pp. 45–49.
60 Ibid., p. 50.
61 Dmitrij G. Fedosov, Michail R. Ryženkov (eds.), Patrik Gordon. Dnevnik 1677–1678, Moscow 2005, pp. 101–129.
62 Brian L. Davies, The Second Chigirin Campaign: Late Muscovite Military Power in Transition, in: Eric Lohr, Marshall Poe (eds.), The Military and Society in Russia: 1450–1917, Leiden 2002, pp. 97–118.

petitioned the Moscow government for engineers and specialists in November; of the eight high-ranking officers sent out to help him, only one had a Russian name. In 1684, Gordon submitted a thesis to the Chancellor V. V. Golitsyn, in which he laid out the possibility, the necessity even, of an offensive war against the Crimean Khanate. This resulted in two campaigns on the peninsula, the first time in history that the Muscovite Empire launched an offensive against the Crimea.

This was also partly made possible by the fact that, with the substantial participation of Western European specialists, Moscow had been constructing a large-scale defensive system on its southern borders, of which the so-called Belgorod and Izium Lines were perhaps the best-known elements. This system consisted not only of fortresses and earthworks, but also of regular troops and conscripted peasants. The 'military colonisation'[63] that accompanied the administrative appropriation and permeation of the region created an area free of violence, which spread ever further to the south, bringing civil colonists in its train.[64] This process occurred at the expense of the 'spaces open to violence' in the northern Black Sea region: the market of violence was not only deprived of its geographical space, but also its economic basis. Such an understanding allows one to examine the crises of the young Hetman state, the civil war which has entered into Ukrainian national historiography as the *Ruina* (1657–1687) in a new light. On the one hand, the increasing shortage of resources intensified the competition both within and between the communities of violence, and on the other hand, it also forced them to act outside of their established logic, so that, for example, Cossacks and Tatars, formerly enemies, increasingly acted as allies. When Cossackdom did manage a short-term consolidation under Ivan Mazepa in 1704, the largest part of the region already found itself, de facto, under Muscovite rule. Following Mazepa's failed attempt, with the assistance of the Swedish King, to free himself from Moscow, Peter I destroyed the Sich. Subsequently, in 1716, the Don Cossacks were subordinated to the newly created College of War.[65]

Patrick Gordon, who in his final years, symbolically, was a close friend and trusted advisor of the young Peter, is not only the best known, but also a typologically very representative example of the hundreds of Western European experts and specialists who entered into the service of Moscow over the course of

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63 Idem, Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700, London 2007, pp. 81–85.

64 Brian J. Boeck, Containment vs. Colonization: Muscovite Approaches to Settling the Steppe, in: Nicholas B. Breyfogle et al. (eds.), Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History, London 2007, pp. 41–60; Carol B. Stevens, The Politics of Food Supply: Grain and the State in Southern Russia, 1640–1700, PhD thesis Ann Arbor 1988, pp. 36–42; idem, Russia's Wars of Emergence, 1460–1730, Harlow 2007, pp. 133–138, 193–196.

65 Local elites "had to adjust to new rules of professionalism and loyalty if they wished to succeed in the fiscal-military states"; Glete, War and the State (cf. note 13), p. 14.

the seventeenth century, and made their careers here.[66] Not only did they bring their specialist expertise with them, they also confronted the Moscow government with a social and administrative challenge: how should they integrate the foreign specialists in violence into the complicated existing system of military administration, which was structured solely around *mestnichestvo*, that is the allocation of positions according to birthright and noble rank? Following attempts to form a parallel system of 'new German regiments', a radical solution was found in 1682: the *mestnichestvo* system was done away with. From now on officers would be promoted according to their skills and their service. A useful contrast to this can be found in the Polish-Lithuanian *autorament* system, in which the army was divided into two parts: the 'national army' (*autorament narodowy*) and the 'foreign army' (*autorament cudzoziemski*), which were strictly separated from one another on all levels. And whereas the Moscow elite strongly sought to integrate the foreign specialists, even at the cost of the abandonment of a long-established system, the Polish nobility pushed in 1667 for the complete abolition of the crown's foreign forces.[67]

In conclusion: western-acculturated violence actors exerted an enormous influence upon the early modern market of violence in Eastern Europe. This extended from (directly) tactics and technologies through to (indirectly) fundamental transformations in the militaries and administrations of the neighbouring states, of which the Muscovite Empire, in which the military revolution was advanced primarily by Western European violence experts, was the most successful.

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66 The Swedish engineer Erik Palmqvist counted in Moscow and Siberia alone 103 West European superior officers in 1673. Tatjana V. Černikova, Evropeizacija Rossii vo vtoroj polovine 15–17 vekach [The Europeanization of Russia from the Second Half of the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Century], Moscow 2012, p. 411.

67 Zbigniew Hundert, Wojsko koronne wobec elekcji 1668 roku [The Army of the Crown towards the Elections of 1668], in: Adam Dobroński et al. (eds.), Studia z dziejów wojskowości, vol. 1, Białystok 2012, pp. 91–114, here p. 94.